- Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis agree on a very important point: that something appears means it must be. This is understood in terms of relevance. Or otherwise, I suppose your neurosis is best ignored, hm?
- To be is not different than to be relevant. It cannot go another way. There is no doubt. This was Descartes’ characteristic fuckery: to pretend that to be could be something other than to appear. If only he applied his perverse wisdom to himself– and disappeared from doubt along with his relevance– then we could have been saved many generations of fuckery.
- Substance Dualism is a conceptual hazard. Descartes was patient zero, and we are now sick with his cognitive divorce. He was a paranoid schizophrenic, in the traditional sense of the term; reality had lost touch with him. All this is to say nothing for political correctness, it is just poetry from a sense.
- There is no deliberate ideology without the notion that we could be wrong about our selves.
- Heidegger perceives essence ecologically. He embodies an ecological theory of visual perception, from a Cognitive Scientific perspective. In much the same way, one at first sees the purpose of Heidegger, and only then can one construe him.
- We might wonder what context could ever be more related to our being than the being-position in which we currently occur– phenomenologically, this is the position from which we find ourselves. It is one’s self that the position reveals, sympathetically.
(Scholarly remark: for more on 5, consider Vervaeke’s concept of
the relationship between agent and arena.)
- Nietzsche was the first person to take the problem of pathos seriously. In that sense, he is a moral pathologist as well as a historian of morality. He asks us: “Where did it hurt?” If only he treated us like a good and caring doctor after that.
- This really is the worst mistake: to neglect that you are unwell. This is the best question: “Why does it hurt?” Another way of asking “Why does it hurt?” is to ask “Where am I, and who?”